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I.	 Introduction	The	revelations	of	Edward	Snowden	of	at	least	part	of	the	true	extent	of	the	gathering	and	processing	of	communications	data	by	the	intelligence	services	of	many	nations,	most	notably	the	US	and	the	UK,	sent	shockwaves	through	the	Internet,	not	least	amongst	those	concerned	with	privacy.	Though	the	information	revealed	relates	primarily	to	government	surveillance,	the	ramifications	are	far	wider	and	far	greater	than	that.	It	is	hard	to	find	a	privacy-related	issue	that	has	not	been	affected	by	them.	The	behaviour	and	actions	of	people,	businesses,	governments	and	courts	have	all	seen	changes,	and	those	changes	have	an	impact.	The	right	to	be	forgotten	is	one	of	those	issues:	it	may	seem	to	have	nothing	to	do	with	government	surveillance	but	there	are	both	direct	and	indirect	connections	between	the	two.	The	Snowden	revelations	have	had	an	impact	on	how	we	understand	the	right	to	be	forgotten,	how	the	right	to	be	forgotten	is	being	implemented,	and	how	we	might	find	an	appropriate	future	for	it.	
1.	 Data	Protection	reform	The	right	to	be	forgotten	has	been	the	subject	of	much	discussion	since	it	was	first	mooted	as	a	key	part	of	the	reform	of	the	European	data	protection	regime.	The	progress	of	the	reform	has	been	complex	and	contentious,	and	the	right	to	be	forgotten	has	been	one	of	the	bones	of	contention	all	the	way	through.	Some	of	the	early	arguments	about	it	have	been	extreme	–	including	suggestions	from	American	academics	that	the	right	to	be	forgotten	‘represents	the	biggest	threat	to	free	speech	on	the	Internet	in	the	coming	decade’2	or	describing	it	as	‘[m]ore	crap	from	the	EU’.3	These	kinds	of	suggestions	were	accompanied	by	a	significant	lobbying	effort	by	Google.		Their	Global	Privacy	Counsel,	Peter	Fleischer,	has	also	blogged	extensively	on	the	subject.4	In	early	2014,	Fleischer	declared	that	the	‘old’	draft	of	the	Data	Protection	Regulation	was	‘dead’	and	would	have	to	be	rewritten.5	Part	of	that	rewrite,	Fleischer	seemed	to	be	implying,	would	be	a	re-casting	or	even	removal	of	the	right	to	be	forgotten.6																																																									2	Rosen,	Stanford	Law	Review	Online,	available	at	http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacy-paradox/right-to-be-forgotten.	3	Bambauer,	Harvard’s	Info/Law	blog,	available	at	http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/infolaw/2012/01/25/more-crap-from-the-e-u/.		4	Fleischer	makes	it	clear	that	the	blogs	represent	his	own	views,	not	those	of	Google.	He	has	written	on	the	subject	many	times,	e.g.	‘Foggy	thinking	about	the	right	to	oblivion’	in	March	2011(http://peterfleischer.blogspot.co.uk/2011/03/foggy-thinking-about-right-to-oblivion.html)		‘"The	Right	to	be	Forgotten",	seen	from	Spain’	in	September	2011	(http://peterfleischer.blogspot.co.uk/2011/09/right-to-be-forgotten-seen-from-spain.html)		‘The	right	to	be	forgotten,	or	how	to	edit	your	history’	in	January	2012	(http://peterfleischer.blogspot.co.uk/2012/01/right-to-be-forgotten-or-how-to-edit.html),	‘Don	Quixote’	(about	the	whole	reform	process)	in	February	2013	(http://peterfleischer.blogspot.co.uk/2013/02/dox-quixote.html).		5	Available	at	http://peterfleischer.blogspot.co.uk/2014/01/turning-our-backs-on-2013.html.		6	The	conflict	between	the	EU	and	the	US	over	the	right	to	be	forgotten	is	examined	in	
Bernal,	'The	EU,	the	US	and	the	Right	to	be	Forgotten',	in	Serge	Gutwirth,	Paul	De	Hert,	and	Ronald	Leenes	(eds.),	Computers,	privacy	and	data	protection-	reloading	data	protection,	2014.	
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EU	regulators	pressed	on	with	the	right	to	be	forgotten	regardless,	and	though	its	form	has	changed	a	little,	as	has	its	name,	to	include	the	word	‘erasure’,	it	is	still	a	crucial	part	of	the	proposed	reform.	In	May	2014	another	critical	event	happened	that	has	made	that	discussion	more	pertinent	and	that	dispute	more	pointed:	the	ruling	by	the	CJEU	in	the	‘Google	Spain	case’7	that,	regardless	of	the	reform	process,	a	form	of	the	right	to	be	forgotten	already	exists	at	least	in	relation	to	search	engines.	It	is	at	least	possible	that	the	outcome	of	the	case	was	influenced	by	the	attitude	of	courts	to	privacy	in	the	post-Snowden	era.	
2.	 The	possible	impact	of	Snowden	and	Google	Spain	combined	The	combination	of	the	two	events	has	forced	upon	governments,	businesses,	academics	and	advocates	a	reassessment	of	what	the	right	to	be	forgotten	could	and	should	mean,	whether	there	is	any	need	for	it	or	any	purpose	to	it	-	and	what	the	consequences	of	its	existence	might	or	might	not	be.		In	some	ways	what	Snowden	uncovered	makes	the	idea	of	a	right	to	be	forgotten	seem	pointless:	what	is	the	point	of	asking	for	anything	on	the	Internet	to	be	erased	or	made	inaccessible	if	secret	archives	of	our	every	activity	are	been	made,	and	made	accessible,	by	a	wide	range	of	authorities?	Conversely,	the	knowledge	that	the	level	of	surveillance	on	activities	on	the	Internet	is	vastly	greater	than	any	but	the	most	active	conspiracy	theorists	might	have	imagined	adds	an	urgency	and	deeper	significance	to	the	need	for	real	and	permanent	deletion	of	data	-	and	for	a	drive	towards	business	models	based	on	less	extensive	data	gathering.	If	we	wish	for	more	privacy,	for	more	protection	from	the	excesses	of	those	performing	surveillance,	the	first	step	is	for	commercial	entities	to	hold	less	data	about	us	-	for	data	minimisation	to	be	paid	more	than	just	lip	service.	Encouraging	business	models	that	embrace	data	minimisation,	as	has	been	argued	before,	is	one	of	the	key	purposes	of	the	erasure	aspect	of	the	right	to	be	forgotten.	Further,	if	Google	Spain	indicates	that	the	right	to	be	forgotten	already	exists,	is	there	any	point	in	those	that	oppose	the	idea	of	the	right	continuing	to	fight	it?	Should	they	accept	the	right,	and	simply	try	to	find	the	best	way	to	implement	it	–	or	should	they	take	a	new	position,	and	work	harder	to	bring	forward	the	reform	of	the	data	protection	regime,	but	ensure	that	the	new	regime	specifically	excludes	the	right	to	be	forgotten,	or	sets	it	out	in	such	a	weak	form	as	to	be	effectively	meaningless?	So	which	is	it?	Does	the	post-Snowden	era	demand	a	stronger	embrace	of	the	right	to	be	forgotten,	or	suggest	a	new	pragmatism	in	which	such	a	right	has	no	place?	It	is	time	to	reassess	what	we	might	want	from	such	a	right,	and	whether	in	the	post-Snowden	environment	such	a	right	might	even	be	possible.	The	timing	is	crucial:	the	combination	of	the	revelations	of	Snowden,	the	Google	Spain	judgment	and	the	on-going	reform	of	the	data	protection	regime	provides	a	unique	opportunity	to	try	to	get	it	right.	With	an	apparently	increasing	level	of	interest	in	privacy	by	the	courts,	and	more	willingness	from	those	courts	to	make	bold	decisions	with	far-reaching	consequences,	it	seems	as	though	some	kind	of	right	to	be	forgotten	will	be	with																																																									7	Case	C‑131/12,	Google	Spain	SL,	Google	Inc.	v	Agencia	Española	de	Protección	de	Datos	
(AEPD),	Mario	Costeja	González.	
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us	for	the	foreseeable	future.	The	question	is	what	form	that	right	will	take	–	a	particularly	pertinent	question	given	that	right	now	it	appears	unclear	what	a	‘right	to	be	forgotten’	actually	means.	What	are	the	differences	between	a	right	to	be	forgotten	and	a	right	to	erasure?	What	does	the	Google	Spain	ruling	imply	–	and	how	does	the	current	form	of	a	right	to	erasure,	as	set	out	in	the	most	recent	draft	of	the	General	Data	Protection	Regulation,	fit	with	it?		This	article	will	attempt	to	answer	these	questions	and	make	this	situation	clearer.	It	will	look	at	what	kind	of	rights	are	needed,	and	how	they	might	come	into	action.	It	will	argue	that	the	need	for	a	right	to	be	forgotten,	appropriately	limited	and	balanced,	has	become	more	intense.	Ensuring	that	the	data	protection	reform	happens,	quickly	but	carefully,	has	become	more	urgent.	
II.	 What	is	the	right	to	be	forgotten?	The	idea	of	a	right	to	be	forgotten	has	been	discussed	so	much,	particularly	since	the	ruling	in	the	Google	Spain	case,	that	it	is	sometimes	difficult	to	be	sure	what	is	meant	by	the	term.	The	first	place	to	start	from	is	the	draft	of	the	General	Data	Protection	Regulation	–	though	it	must	be	remembered	that	the	regulation	has	not	yet	been	agreed,	and	in	the	light	of	the	Google	Spain	ruling	there	may	be	intense,	late	lobbying	to	change	the	wording	and	the	meaning.	
Article	17:Right	to	be	forgotten	and	to	erasure		
1.	The	data	subject	shall	have	the	right	to	obtain	from	the	controller	the	erasure	of	
personal	data	relating	to	them	and	the	abstention	from	further	dissemination	of	
such	data,	especially	in	relation	to	personal	data	which	are	made	available	by	the	
data	subject	while	he	or	she	was	a	child,	where	one	of	the	following	grounds	
applies:		
(a)	the	data	are	no	longer	necessary	in	relation	to	the	purposes	for	which	
they	were	collected	or	otherwise	processed;		
(b)	the	data	subject	withdraws	consent	on	which	the	processing	is	based	
according	to	point	(a)	of	Article	6(1),	or	when	the	storage	period	consented	
to	has	expired,	and	where	there	is	no	other	legal	ground	for	the	processing	
of	the	data;		
(c)	the	data	subject	objects	to	the	processing	of	personal	data	pursuant	to	
Article	19;		
(d)	the	processing	of	the	data	does	not	comply	with	this	Regulation	for	
other	reasons.		
2.	Where	the	controller	referred	to	in	paragraph	1	has	made	the	personal	data	
public,	it	shall	take	all	reasonable	steps,	including	technical	measures,	in	relation	to	
data	for	the	publication	of	which	the	controller	is	responsible,	to	inform	third	
parties	which	are	processing	such	data,	that	a	data	subject	requests	them	to	erase	
any	links	to,	or	copy	or	replication	of	that	personal	data.	Where	the	controller	has	
authorised	a	third	party	publication	of	personal	data,	the	controller	shall	be	
considered	responsible	for	that	publication.	It	should	be	noted	that	this	latter	paragraph	was	much	stronger	in	the	earlier	drafts	of	the	regulation:	rather	than	requiring	steps	to	be	taken	to	inform	third	parties,	the	right	was	intended	to	make	controllers	take	all	reasonable	steps	to	
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…ensure	the	erasure	of	any	public	Internet	link	to,	copy	of,	or	replication	of	the	
personal	data	relating	to	the	data	subject	contained	in	any	publicly	available	
communication	service	which	allows	or	facilitates	the	search	of	or	access	to	this	
personal	data.	This	was	much	more	of	a	‘seek	and	destroy’	instruction	–	and	Google	and	others	understandably	lobbied	successfully	to	have	it	watered	down	to	its	current	form.	Article	17	is	subject	to	the	usual	caveats	and	qualifications,8	including	public	interest	in	public	health,	historical,	statistical	and	scientific	research	purposes,	compliance	with	a	legal	obligation	and,	most	pertinently	perhaps,	freedom	of	expression,	as	set	out	in	Article	80:	
“Member	States	shall	provide	for	exemptions	or	derogations	from	the	provisions	on	
the	general	principles…	…for	the	processing	of	personal	data	carried	out	solely	for	
journalistic	purposes	or	the	purpose	of	artistic	or	literary	expression	in	order	to	
reconcile	the	right	to	the	protection	of	personal	data	with	the	rules	governing	
freedom	of	expression.”	The	interpretation	of	these	exemptions	or	derogations	is	critical	to	one	aspect	of	the	right	to	be	forgotten	–	what	constitutes	‘literary	expression’,	for	example?	Is	any	piece	of	text	literary	expression	–	or,	to	take	it	even	further,	as	Jane	Bambauer	has	done,	should	any	form	of	data	be	considered	‘speech’,	and	thus	literary	expression?9	Conversely,	does	the	inclusion	of	the	word	‘solely’	mean	that	almost	nothing	is	exempted,	as	it	could	be	possible	to	find	multiple	purposes	for	almost	any	data	–	is	an	email	literary	expression,	or	communication,	for	example?	
1.	 Data	or	stories	–	and	‘forgetting’	or	erasure?	Though	making	these	kinds	of	distinctions	is	difficult,	there	does	seem	to	be	a	clear	difference	between	something	that	can	be	viewed	as	relatively	‘pure’	data	–	for	example	a	web-user’s	browsing	history	–	and	something	that	is	clearly	a	‘story’,	for	example	a	newspaper	article	about	an	event.	The	latter	is	clearly	‘expression’	and	should,	in	European	Convention	terms,	engage	Article	10.	The	former	is	generally	never	intended	to	be	published	or	indeed	seen	by	anyone	except	the	user,	and	then	only	to	navigate	forward	and	backward,	or	to	find	websites	previously	visited.	This	demonstrates	the	difference	between	a	right	to	be	forgotten	and	a	right	to	‘erasure’.	Stories	can	potentially	be	forgotten,	while	data	can	be	erased.		In	a	good	deal	of	the	discussion,	particularly	in	the	media,	this	differentiation	is	missed	but	it	is	crucial	to	the	way	that	any	right	to	be	forgotten	could	work	or	should	be	understood.	The	Google	Spain	case	is	all	about	stories:	events	or	records	that	have	at	least	in	some	ways	become	'public',	and	are	'searchable'	via	Google	or	some	other	search	engine.	Whilst	this	is	important	-	and	hence	has	been	the	focus	of	attention	in	the	media	and	indeed	in	the	courts,	it	only	constitutes	part	of	the	data	that	is	relevant	here,	and	the	part	which	might	be	the	least	appropriate	for	erasure,	particularly	in	the	light	of	Article	10	rights.	Data	that	is	not	published,	or	has	not	yet	been	published,	may	be	much	more	important	-	particularly	in	the	post-Snowden	context.	This	includes	things	like																																																									8	Set	out	in	Article	17	(3)	and	(4)	of	the	draft	General	Data	Protection	Regulation.	9	In	Bambauer,	'Is	Data	Speech?',	Stanford	Law	Review,	2014,	66	(-),	62.	
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the	aforementioned	browsing	histories,	profiles,	individual	search	logs,	meta	data	from	many	forms	of	communications,	social	mapping	data,	geolocation	data,	transaction	records	from	online	shopping,	health	data	and	many	other	kinds	of	data.	These	are	forms	of	data	that	are	not	stories	nor,	generally,	should	be	publically	searchable,	but	which	are	critical	in	terms	of	privacy	and	autonomy.	They	are	also	precisely	the	kind	of	data	that	what	was	revealed	by	Snowden	suggests	are	being	gathered	by	the	intelligence	agencies	and	others.	Further,	there	are	two	different	ways	to	deal	with	the	data,	in	some	ways	reflected	in	the	bifurcated	name	of	the	right:	forgetting	and	erasure.	Forgetting	can	be	viewed	as	focusing	on	the	viewer/reader	of	the	data	(the	person	who	is	being	asked	to	forget)	while	erasure	focuses	on	the	data	itself	(which	is	what	needs	to	be	erased).	Forgetting	is	about	making	the	data	or	story	difficult	(or	potentially	impossible)	to	find,	while	erasure	is	about	removing	the	data	entirely.	Erasure	is	therefore	in	general	a	stronger	concept	–	because	if	data	is	genuinely	erased,	it	cannot	be	found	or	viewed.		When	these	two	dimensions	(stories	vs.	data	and	forgetting	vs.	erasure)	are	set	out	in	a	table,	four	different	scenarios	can	be	seen,	each	of	which	presents	different	problems	and	requires	different	solutions.	
Table	1	
Issues	 Type	of	data		 Stories	 Data	Forgetting		 Stories	made	hard	to	locate	 Data	made	difficult	to	gather	or	understand	
Erasure		 Stories	erased	from	the	Internet	 Data	deleted	
	Neither	the	stories-data	axis	nor	the	forgetting-erasure	axis	is	simple.	Though	all	stories	are	data,	a	story	may	exist	in	a	number	of	different	forms,	each	of	which	involves	different	data.	Accordingly,	though	erasure	is	generally	a	stronger	concept	than	forgetting,	deleting	one	form	of	story-data	will	not	necessarily	delete	the	story	itself,	even	if	that	form	is	the	‘original’	of	the	story,	if	that	story	exists	in	a	different	form.		Each	of	the	different	quarters	of	the	table	presents	a	different	problem	–	and	demands	a	different	solution,	as	shall	be	seen	below.	The	legal	and	technical	approaches	to	each	have	been	and	should	be	different.	The	issue	of	forgetting	stories,	for	example,	is	what	many	people	think	as	a	‘right	to	be	forgotten’	–	and	it	is	what	the	ruling	in	the	Google	Spain	case	relates	to,	and	is	the	first	one	to	be	addressed.	
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III.	 Google	Spain	The	Google	Spain	case	concerned	a	Spanish	man	who	found	that	when	people	searched	for	him	on	Google	found	an	old	story	–	an	official	notice	in	a	newspaper	from	1998	–	about	a	property	belonging	to	the	man	having	been	put	up	for	auction	in	relation	to	his	social	security	debts.	The	debts	were	settled	before	the	auction,	which	never	took	place.	The	man	originally	sought	to	have	the	newspaper	notice	removed	from	the	net:	this	was	refused	by	the	Spanish	Data	Protection	Authority	(AEPD),	as	the	notice	was	part	of	the	public	record	and	the	paper	was	under	a	legal	obligation	to	report	it.	The	man	also	asked	Google	to	remove	the	links	to	that	official	notice:	the	AEDP	agreed	and	placed	an	injunction	on	both	Google	Spain	and	Google	Inc.	Google	appealed,	the	case	was	referred	to	the	ECJ,	who	effectively	ruled	that	Google	did	have	to	stop	the	link	to	the	story	from	appearing	in	searches	for	the	man’s	name.	It	was	a	bold	and	far-reaching	ruling	and	took	observers	by	surprise	by	contradicting	the	earlier	opinion	of	the	Advocate	General,	who	had	effectively	opined	in	Google’s	favour.	The	ECJ	ruled	very	broadly,	and	not	just	in	relation	to	the	particulars	of	the	Google	Spain	case.	They	said:	
“As	the	data	subject	may,	in	the	light	of	his	fundamental	rights	under	Articles	7	and	
8	of	the	Charter,	request	that	the	information	in	question	no	longer	be	made	
available	to	the	general	public	on	account	of	its	inclusion	in	such	a	list	of	results,	
those	rights	override,	as	a	rule,	not	only	the	economic	interest	of	the	operator	of	the	
search	engine	but	also	the	interest	of	the	general	public	in	having	access	to	that	
information	upon	a	search	relating	to	the	data	subject’s	name”.	Overriding	the	business	imperative	is	one	thing	(though	whether	such	a	clear	enunciation	of	the	override	would	have	been	made	against	a	European	business	is	a	moot	point)	but	overriding	the	'general	public's	right	to	information'	is	quite	another.	The	question	of	whether	one	charter	right	can	really	override	another	is	a	difficult	one.	The	balance	between	the	two	rights	may	be	implicit	-	but	perhaps	it	needs	to	be	explicit.	In	this	matter,	as	the	whole	history	of	the	right	to	be	forgotten	has	illustrated,	the	appearance	and	the	emotional	reaction	to	the	words	used	makes	a	difference	to	how	the	law	is	implemented	and	understood.	This	is	particularly	pertinent	here	as	one	of	the	primary	criticisms	of	the	right	to	be	forgotten	has	been	that	it	might	produce	a	chilling	effect.	That	chilling	effect	depends	on	the	perception	more	than	the	actual	law,	as	most	lay	people	cannot	be	expected	either	to	know	or	to	understand	the	nuances	of	the	law.	This	point	implicitly	acknowledges	that,	in	practice,	the	economic	interests	of	the	search	engines	have	been	a	crucial	factor	–	perhaps	the	crucial	factor	–	in	the	resistance	to	the	right	to	be	forgotten,	for	all	that	it	has,	in	the	US	at	least,	been	mostly	expressed	in	terms	of	freedom	of	expression.10	Indeed,	it	can	be	argued	that	possible	interference	with	economic	interests	have	been	the	critical	factor	in	the	extensive	lobbying	and	delays	to	the	negotiation	of	the	reform	of	the	data	protection	regime	as	a	whole.	
																																																									10	See	the	discussion	of	the	competing	interests	in	Bernal,	'The	EU,	the	US	and	the	Right	to	be	Forgotten',	in	Serge	Gutwirth,	Paul	De	Hert,	and	Ronald	Leenes	(eds.),	Computers,	privacy	and	data	protection-	reloading	data	protection,	2014.		
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1.	 Academic	shockwaves	from	Google	Spain	The	ruling	in	Google	Spain	sent	its	own	shockwaves	though	the	Internet	–	not	such	profound	and	far	reaching	as	those	produced	by	the	Snowden	revelations,	but	in	some	ways	more	intense	and	more	directed.	The	full	impact	of	the	ruling	has	still	to	be	seen,	but	even	in	the	first	few	weeks	after	the	ruling	things	were	beginning	to	happen.	Those	who	had	suggested	that	the	right	to	be	forgotten	was	already	essentially	implicit	in	the	data	protection	regime	had	been	proven	correct	–	at	least	in	the	eyes	of	the	ECJ,	and	at	least	to	the	extent	that	the	‘hiding’	of	stories	were	concerned.	The	Google	Spain	ruling	brought	back	all	the	original	criticisms	of	the	right	to	be	forgotten	and	added	a	few	new	ones.	Academic	commentators	were	remarkably	active:	more	than	75	blog	posts,	newspaper	articles	or	equivalents	were	written	in	the	first	month	after	the	ruling,	including	pieces	by	such	luminaries	as	Mayer-Schönberger,	Morozov,	Posner,	Solove	and	Zittrain,	as	well	as	responses	by	the	UK’s	ICO,	the	Article	29	Working	Party	and	others.11	The	Google	Spain	ruling	seemed	to	focus	the	minds	of	those	on	both	sides	arguing	about	the	right	to	be	forgotten:	the	outpourings	of	opinion	by	academics	in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	the	decision	were	extensive	and	multifaceted,	but	to	a	great	degree	reiterated	the	primary	previous	objections	to	the	right.		These	objections	can	broadly	be	divided	into	categories:	1) That	the	right	to	be	forgotten	interferes	with	freedom	of	expression	to	
an	excessive	degree.	Many	of	these	criticisms,	but	far	from	all,	emanate	from	the	United	States,	where	the	First	Amendment	means	that	freedom	of	expression	is	generally	assumed	to	‘trump’	privacy	or	reputation	rights	except	in	extraordinary	circumstances.	These	criticisms	include	the	suggestion	that	the	right	to	be	forgotten	will	be	used	to	rewrite	history	–	and	spectres	such	as	the	alteration	of	photographs	under	Stalin’s	Soviet	regime	and	the	feeling	that	the	likes	of	Berlusconi	might	wish	to	similarly	airbrush	their	past	have	been	regularly	aired.	Other	examples	used	to	make	this	point	have	included	the	example	of	the	murderers	of	German	actor	Walter	Sedlmayr	attempting	to	have	their	criminal	history	removed	from	Sedlmayr’s	Wikipedia	page	–	something	which	does	indeed	look	like	censorship	or	the	rewriting	of	history.12		2) That	the	right	to	be	forgotten	is	impractical,	or	cannot	ever	be	made	to	
work.	The	complexity	of	removal	of	information	from	the	Internet	is	central	to	this	objection	–	and	the	ability	of	Internet	users	to	find	ways	around	censorship	and	control,	the	Streisand	Effect	and	so	forth	all	feed	into	this.	Closely	related	to	this	is	the	sense	that	suggesting	that	people	have	a	right	to	be	forgotten	will	raise	false	expectations	and	deceive	people	into	acting	with	less	care	than	they	should.	Google’s	response	to	the	ruling,	discussed	below,	could	be	argued	to	both	strengthen	and																																																									11	A	compendium	of	academic	commentaries	to	the	Google	Spain	case	has	been	compiled	by	Julia	Powles	and	Jat	Singh	of	Cambridge	University,	and	may	be	found	at	http://www.cambridge-code.org/googlespain.html.		12	This	case	was	central	to	Rosen’s	argument	in	his	aforementioned	piece	in	the	Stanford	Law	Review	Online:	http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacy-paradox/right-to-be-forgotten.	
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weaken	this	point	depending	on	your	perspective:	they	have	already	introduced	a	system	that	seemingly	allows	the	right	(in	its	limited	form)	to	function,	but	at	the	same	time	this	system	seems	to	produce	exactly	the	bad	effects	that	opponents	of	the	right	to	be	forgotten	predicted.	3) That	the	right	to	be	forgotten	will	stifle	the	general	freedom	of	the	
Internet.	This	is	a	variant	of	a	common	suggestion	that	to	take	privacy	into	account	restricts	innovation,	viewing	data	protection	and	related	regulation	as	bureaucratic	barriers	to	the	businesses	that	create	and	stimulate	the	Internet.	The	extent	to	which	this	is	a	real	objection	is	a	little	unclear:	from	a	more	libertarian	(or	specifically	cyber-libertarian)	perspective,	any	legislation	restricts	freedom	and	any	attempt	by	conventional	regulators	is	both	undesirable	and	doomed	to	failure.	To	these	criticisms	has	been	added	an	extra	suggestion,	building	on	the	way	that	the	Google	Spain	ruling	seems	to	have	been	interpreted	by	Google:	that	a	right	to	be	forgotten	places	even	more	power	in	the	hands	of	Google,	as	Google	will,	in	the	first	instance	at	least,	be	the	ones	who	determine	whether	or	not	a	request	for	a	link	to	a	story	to	be	removed	will	be	honoured.	This	latter	criticism	has	a	degree	of	validity,	though	the	extent	to	which	Google	already	has	this	power	–	and	wields	it	–	is	a	factor	not	so	often	mentioned	by	the	critics	of	the	right	to	be	forgotten.	The	validity	of	these	criticisms	to	the	initial	proposals	for	the	form	of	a	right	to	be	forgotten	in	the	proposed	reform	to	the	data	protection	regime	had	been	the	subject	of	a	good	degree	of	academic	analysis	–	but	the	extent	to	which	this	debate	had	remained	unresolved	can	be	seen	by	the	sheer	volume	of	opinion	offered	in	the	wake	of	the	Google	Spain	verdict,	to	a	significant	degree	repeating	and	reaffirming	the	prior	positions	of	those	involved.	The	Google	Spain	verdict	has,	however,	made	the	situation	much	more	urgent.	This	is	no	longer	a	primarily	theoretical	debate,	but	one	that	is	being	played	out	for	real	right	now.	It	has	also	changed	the	dynamics	of	the	reform	process:	there	was	a	sense	that	before	Google	Spain,	the	lobbying	energies	of	the	Internet	giants,	led	by	Google	itself,	were	aiming	not	just	at	weakening	the	reform	but	delaying	it	or	perhaps	even	killing	it.13	After	Google	Spain,	this	appears	very	likely	to	change.	The	legal	possibilities	for	Google	to	have	the	ruling	reversed	are	very	limited	indeed,	as	the	ruling	was	by	the	Grand	Chamber	of	the	CJEU.	There	is	no	obvious	appeal	process,	though	there	might	be	a	route	to	challenge	particular	examples	through	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights	on	Article	10	grounds.	That,	however,	would	be	difficult	and	very	likely	to	be	slow.	The	data	protection	reform	process	might	well	be	Google’s	best	chance	to	free	themselves	from	the	apparent	shackles	and	administrative	burden	that	the	ruling	seemingly	imposes,	as	a	new	data	protection	regime,	with	an	explicitly	stated	right	to	erasure,	could	effectively	override	the	Google	Spain	ruling.	Rather	than	seeking	to	delay	or	block	the	reform,	therefore,	their	efforts	may	be	better	directed	to	speed	up	the	reform,	so	long	as	the	right	to	erasure	within	it	is	expressed	in	a	more	limited	form.	
																																																									13	See	particularly	the	various	blogs	by	Peter	Fleischer	discussed	in	footnote	3	above.	
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2.	 Google’s	response	to	the	Google	Spain	ruling	Google’s	response	to	the	Google	Spain	ruling	has	been	fast,	somewhat	surprising,	and	possible	to	read	in	a	number	of	different	ways.	As	they	describe	it	in	their	‘FAQ’	on	the	right	to	be	forgotten:	“Since	this	ruling	was	published	on	13	May	2014,	we've	been	working	around	the	clock	to	comply.”14	Google’s	immediate	response	has	a	number	of	facets.	Firstly,	they	have	provided	a	‘web	form’	for	people	who	wish	to	make	an	individual	request,	and	say	that	they	will	evaluate	each	request	individually.	In	the	month	following	the	ruling,	Google	have	said	that	they	received	around	70,000	such	requests:15	a	large	number,	but	in	the	context	of	Google’s	scale	it	is	actually	relatively	small.	In	approximately	the	same	period,	Google	received	requests	for	the	removal	of	more	than	25	million	URLs	on	the	basis	of	copyright	–	hundreds	of	times	more.16	Google	has	put	together	an	expert	‘advisory	committee’	to	negotiate	the	issues,	including	Wikipedia	cofounder	Jimmy	Wales,	Oxford	Professor	of	Information	Ethics	Luciano	Floridi,	UN	Special	Rapporteur	for	the	Promotion	and	Protection	of	the	Right	to	Freedom	of	Opinion	and	Expression	of	the	UNHRC	Frank	La	Rue.17	Secondly,	Google	have	added	a	note	to	the	search	results	for	any	individual	name	(other	than	a	name	of	a	public	figure)	that	‘Some	results	may	have	been	removed	under	data	protection	law	in	Europe’.	Thirdly,	Google	have	started	to	notify	people	(and	in	particular	journalists)18	that	some	links	to	their	stories	have	been	deleted.	A	number	of	things	are	apparent	from	Google’s	rapid	response	–	and	some	are	far	less	clear.	Firstly,	they	have	acted	very	fast,	faster	than	any	of	the	other	search	engines,	though	the	Google	Spain	ruling	applies	equally	to	all.	That	in	itself	could	be	significant,	as	before	the	Google	Spain	ruling	Google’s	tactics	not	just	in	this	area	but	also	in	other	dealings	with	the	European	Union	seemed	to	be	characterised	more	by	slowness	than	speed.19	Secondly,	the	blocks	that	seem	to	have	happened	do	not	look	immediately	as	though	they	fit	within	the	categories	immediately	obvious	from	the	Google	Spain	ruling:	James	Ball	in	the	Guardian	was	notified	about	stories	from	as	recently	as	2011,20	while	Robert	Peston	of	the	BBC	was	notified	about	a	story	on	as	topical	and	in	the	public	interest	subject	as																																																									14	The	FAQs	are	available	under	http://www.google.co.uk/policies/faq/.	15	Reported	for	example	at	http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jul/03/google-right-to-be-forgotten-law-uk-news-search-requests.		16	According	to	Google’s	transparency	report,	accessed	09.07.2014,	25,649,607	URLs	had	been	requested	to	be	removed	in	the	previous	month.	See	http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/copyright/.			17	See	https://www.google.com/advisorycouncil/.		18	Notably	James	Ball	in	the	Guardian	and	Robert	Peston	of	the	BBC	–	see	footnotes	20	and	21	respectively.	19	For	example	in	their	negotiations	over	data	retention	periods	for	search	logs,	as	discussed	in	Chapter	5	of	Bernal,	Internet	privacy	rights:	rights	to	protect	autonomy,	2014.	20	See	http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/02/eu-right-to-be-forgotten-guardian-google.		
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the	removal	of	a	senior	executive	from	a	major	bank.21	These	are	not	old,	or	irrelevant	stories,	and	nothing	like	the	original	story	that	was	the	subject	of	the	Google	Spain	case.	It	looks,	on	the	face	of	it,	as	though	Google’s	initial	response	was	to	‘overblock’:	whether	by	clumsiness	or	in	a	more	calculated	response	to	help	characterise	the	right	to	be	forgotten	as	a	form	of	censorship	and	a	threat	to	freedom	of	expression	is	not	easy	to	determine.	Similarly,	whether	the	alerts	to	journalists	were	clumsy	or	deliberately	intended	to	inspire	articles	against	the	ruling	is	also	unclear	–	it	was	notable	that	it	appears	that	only	UK	journalists	received	such	alerts	rather	than	journalists	in	other	EU	states,	though	the	Google	Spain	ruling	applies	throughout	the	EU.	There	has	been	more	resistance	to	the	right	to	be	forgotten	in	the	UK	than	other	EU	states,	including	a	notable	speech	by	Kenneth	Clarke,	then	Lord	Chancellor	and	Secretary	of	State	for	Justice.22	How	this	plays	out	over	the	months	to	come	needs	careful	watching.	It	could	be	that	Google	are	making	a	genuine	albeit	clumsy	attempt	to	find	a	workable	solution.	It	could	also	be	that,	as	some	critics	of	the	right	to	be	forgotten	have	suggested,	that	the	right	itself	is	fundamentally	unworkable	–	or	at	least	so	difficult	to	make	work	in	any	meaningful	fashion	that	the	negatives	outweigh	the	positives.	Finally,	it	could	be	that	this	is	just	another	calculated	episode	in	Google’s	overall	campaign	against	the	right	to	be	forgotten,	and	needs	to	be	considered	in	the	light	of	future	negotiations	over	the	right	and	how	it	can	or	could	be	incorporated	in	the	reform	of	the	data	protection	regime.	
	
IV.	 Google	Spain	in	the	context	of	Snowden	The	connections	between	the	revelations	of	Edwards	Snowden	and	the	Google	Spain	case	are	not	obvious.	One	concerns	government	surveillance	and	data	gathering,	the	other	the	unforgiving	and	‘unforgetting’	nature	of	the	Internet	and	in	particular	search.	One	concerns	the	protection	of	individuals	from	government	intrusion,	the	other	the	protection	of	individuals	from	other	individuals	and	from	Internet	businesses	such	as	Google.	There	are,	however,	strong	links	between	them,	in	at	least	two	ways.	
1.	 Courts	showing	more	privacy-awareness	The	first	relates	to	the	position	that	privacy	holds	in	the	minds	of	people.	As	noted	above,	governments,	businesses,	academics	and	advocates	have	all	been	caught	up	in	the	story	–	though	the	precise	nature	of	what	was	uncovered	by	Snowden,	how	much	of	it	is	true	as	so	forth	remains	unclear.		What	does	appear	clear	is	that	the	scale	of	surveillance	–	and	specifically	of	data	gathering	–	on	the	Internet	undertaken	by	governments	and	their	agencies	is	of	a	scale	and	scope	that	previously	only	conspiracy	theorists	would	have	contemplated.	That	has	an	impact	on	anyone	concerned	with	privacy.	In	many	ways	the	details	of	the	surveillance	and	data	gathering	that	is	taking	place	may	be	less	important	than	the	perception.	It	is	the	perception	that	alters	the	behaviour	of	people,	the	reactions	of	companies	and	the	governments	and	so	forth.																																																									21	See	http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-28130581.	22	His	speech,	from	May	2011	can	be	found	online	at	http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/about/moj/our-ministers-board/speeches/clarke-speech-data-protection-260511.doc.		
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In	particular,	it	may	well	have	had	an	impact	on	the	courts.	In	recent	months	there	seems	to	have	been	a	trend	of	courts	–	and	the	CJEU	in	particular	–	taking	a	stronger	stance	on	privacy,	getting	closer	to	grips	with	the	technology,	and	being	willing	to	make	bold,	potentially	controversial	rulings	that	challenge	powerful	interest	groups.	Perhaps	the	strongest	of	these	was	the	decision	by	the	CJEU	in	April	2014	that	the	Data	Retention	Directive	was	invalid.23	In	this	case,	as	in	the	Google	Spain	case,	the	CJEU	went	further	in	the	direction	of	supporting	privacy	than	the	Advocate-General’s	Opinion	suggested.	In	the	Data	Retention	example,	the	links	to	the	Snowden	revelations	are	much	more	direct	than	in	Google	Spain,	as	the	Data	Retention	Directive	concerns	an	aspect	of	mass	surveillance,	but	in	both	cases	the	increased	emphasis	on	the	importance	of	privacy	is	highlighted	in	both	the	decision	and	the	language	used	by	the	CJEU	in	the	judgments.	Other	recent	judicial	decisions	in	other	courts	seem	to	show	similar	patterns:	the	Irish	High	Court	in	referring	the	Europe	vs.	Facebook	case	to	the	CJEU,24	the	UK	Supreme	Court	in	its	ruling	over	the	disclosure	of	past	criminal	records	in	job	applications,25	and	even	the	US	Supreme	Court	in	its	ruling	over	the	need	for	warrants	to	search	the	contents	of	mobile	phones.26		Whilst	only	the	Data	Retention	invalidity	and	the	Europe	vs.	Facebook	case	make	direct	reference	to	what	was	uncovered	by	Snowden,	it	may	not	be	too	much	of	a	stretch	to	link	the	others	to	the	increased	awareness	and	understanding	both	of	privacy	and	of	technology	that	the	Snowden	revelations	have	brought	about.	That	change	of	atmosphere	is	something	that	needs	to	be	considered	very	carefully	when	looking	at	how	we	should	address	the	right	to	be	forgotten.	
2.	 Links	between	authorities	and	commercial	organisations.	One	of	the	key	aspects	of	what	was	revealed	by	Snowden	is	the	relationship	between	the	authorities	and	commercial	organisations	over	surveillance.	The	PRISM	programme,	in	particular,	suggested	that	the	NSA	and	others	had	direct	access	to	the	servers	of	commercial	Internet	companies	such	as	Apple,	Microsoft,	Yahoo!,	Facebook	and	Google.	The	way	that	this	access	worked,	and	the	extent	to	which	cooperation	between	the	companies	and	the	government	agencies	was	willing	rather	than	coerced	has	remained	unclear,	and	given	the	nature	of	the	subject	it	may	well	always	remain	unclear,	but	the	implications	of	this	and	other	related	discoveries	are	direct.	It	appears	a	reasonable	assumption	that	most	of	what	is	gathered	and	collected	by	commercial	organisations	for	commercial	purposes	may	well	be	accessible	by	government	agencies	for	their	own	purposes.		This	has	a	profound	impact	upon	both	how	people	–	the	customers	of	these	commercial	services	–	view	and	potentially	use	those	services	and	upon	the	positions	taken	by	the	companies	concerned	in	relation	to	government	access	to	their	data	and	to	privacy	more	generally.	Before	the	Google	Spain	ruling,	Google	had	shown	some	distinct	signs	of	changing	their	position	in	relation	to	privacy	-	and	Snowden	appears	to	have	played	a	significant	part	in	bringing	about	that																																																									23	In	Joined	Cases	C-293/12	and	C-594/12	
Digital	Rights	Ireland	and	Seitlinger	and	Others.	24	In	Schrems	vs.	Data	Protection	Commissioner,	[2014]	IEHC	310.		25	In	R	(T)	v	SSHD	[2014]	UKSC	35.	26	In	13-132	Riley	v.	California	(06/25/2014).
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change.	In	the	US	what	Snowden	uncovered	has	made	the	government	agencies	look	as	though	they	were	in	some	ways	going	against	the	ordinary	people.	As	a	consequence,	if	Google	and	others	were	not	to	be	considered	substantially	to	be	working	with	the	NSA	-	and	hence	against	ordinary	people	-	they	needed	to	show	that	they	would	work	for	those	ordinary	people,	and	resisting	the	excessive	surveillance	requirements	of	the	government	agencies.	That	has	meant	being	more	aggressive	in	their	pushes	for	'transparency',	and	against	overweening	surveillance.	Google	is	part	of	the	‘Reform	Government	Surveillance’	movement,27	for	example.	It	has	also	meant	more	of	an	embrace	of	privacy-supportive	technologies	such	as	encryption	–	for	example	in	email	connections	to	servers.28	Google	and	others	are	also	trying	to	ensure	that	people	differentiate	between	the	kinds	of	surveillance	and	potentially	privacy-invasive	practices	engaged	in	by	commercial	organisations	and	those	performed	by	the	authorities,	a	point	emphasised	by	some	of	the	privacy	advocacy	groups,	who	created	their	own	alternative	to	the	‘Reform	Government	Surveillance’	movement:	‘Reform	Corporate	Surveillance’.	As	Bruce	Schneier	explained	on	the	Reform	Corporate	Surveillance	website:	“The	NSA	didn't	wake	up	and	say,	‘Let's	just	spy	on	everybody.’	They	looked	up	and	said,	‘Wow,	corporations	are	spying	on	everybody.	Let's	get	ourselves	a	copy.’”29	It	is	difficult	to	disagree	with	Schneier.	Indeed,	this	is	the	logic	applied	by	Hogan,	J	in	the	Europe	vs.	Facebook	case,	which	hinges	on	the	way	that	the	Safe	Harbor	agreement	might	not	protect	data	held	by	Facebook	in	the	US	from	access	by	US	authorities.	If	the	data	were	not	being	gathered	by	the	commercial	organisations	in	the	first	place,	the	authorities	would	not	be	able	to	gain	access	to	it,	directly	or	indirectly,	through	legal	or	illegal	means.	If	people	are	to	be	protected	from	intrusion	into	their	private	lives	by	authorities,	whether	from	their	own	governments	or	others,	intrusions,	data	gathering	and	data	holding	by	commercial	organisations	need	to	be	taken	into	account.	The	referral	of	the	Europe	vs.	Facebook	case	to	the	CJEU	is	based	on	that	understanding	–	and	as	awareness	of	the	nuances	of	the	relationship	between	privacy	and	technology	increases,	other	courts	may	well	take	similar	views.		
3.	 Contrasting	the	Google	Spain	and	Snowden	issues	Though	there	are	similarities	and	connections	between	the	issues	that	underlie	the	concern	raised	by	Snowden	and	the	Google	Spain	case,	there	are	also	qualitative	differences.	Considering	again	the	bifurcated	nature	of	the	right	to	be	forgotten,	as	set	out	in	Table	1	above,	there	are	two	aspects	to	the	right:		the	'forgetting'	and	the	'erasure'.	Google	Spain	ruled	clearly	on	the	'forgetting'	element,	but	not	on	the	erasure.	When	considering	Snowden,	however,	the																																																									27	https://www.reformgovernmentsurveillance.com.	28	See	for	example	http://googleblog.blogspot.co.uk/2014/03/staying-at-forefront-of-email-security.html	in	response	to	the	MUSCULAR	system,	see	http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_print.html.		29	See	at	http://reformcorporatesurveillance.com.		
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erasure	part	of	the	right	may	be	more	significant,	in	two	ways.	Firstly,	on	the	assumption	(which	may	be	false)	that	data	is	not	automatically	gathered	on	creation,	erasure	could	increase	the	chances	that	this	data	is	not	ever	'communicated'	and	hence	added	to	the	NSA's	stockpiles.	Secondly,	and	perhaps	more	importantly,	the	development	of	the	right	to	erasure	would	encourage	the	development	of	lean	business	models	that	do	not	rely	so	heavily	on	the	accumulation	of	data.30	However,	what	people	often	want	in	relation	to	either	commercial	organisations	or	other	individuals	(as	opposed	to	authorities)	is	the	forgetting	aspect	of	the	right.	That	is,	as	in	the	Google	Spain	case	itself,	their	real	concern	isn’t	permanent	erasure	of	the	data,	or	the	rewriting	of	history,	but	that	what	people	(or	organisations)	find	out	about	them	on	an	ordinary	search	or	relatively	cursory	investigation	is	not	skewed	or	misleading	as	a	result	of	the	over-prioritisation	of	old	or	irrelevant	information.	The	UK	Supreme	Court	decision	in	R	(T)	v	SSHD	[2014]	UKSC	35,	over	the	disclosure	of	past	criminal	convictions	in	job	applications,	is	exactly	on	that	point.	This	does	not	require	the	rewriting	of	history,	or	the	erasure	of	records,	but	what	Selinger	and	Hartzog	have	referred	to	as	‘obscurity’.31	One	potentially	positive	aspect	of	the	Google	Spain	ruling	is	that	it	might	encourage	Google	to	develop	algorithms	that	downplay	older,	less	'relevant'	stories	-	the	kind	that	should	be	'forgotten'	-	so	as	to	avoid	too	many	applications	for	removal.	This,	as	well	as	helping	Google	could,	in	effect,	improve	the	chances	of	people	achieving	the	kind	of	obscurity	that	underlies	the	Google	Spain	case.	This	has	parallels	to	the	way	that	the	erasure	part	of	the	right	to	be	forgotten	could	encourage	the	development	of	leaner	business	models.	It	also	could	be	argued	to	begin	to	address	the	somewhat	vague	objection	to	the	right	to	be	forgotten	that	it	stifles	Internet	freedom.			
V.	 The	Right	to	be	Forgotten	in	the	post-Snowden	era	To	look	at	where	this	leaves	us	and	what	the	prospects	are	for	the	future,	we	must	look	at	what	has	changed	since	the	Snowden	revelations,	and	at	what	has	not	changed.	One	of	the	most	important	things	that	seems	to	have	changed	is	our	perception	of	vulnerability	–	and	with	it	our	understanding	of	the	importance	of	privacy.	The	idea	that	privacy	really	didn’t	matter	to	people,	that	in	Mark	Zuckerberg’s	words	it	was	‘no	longer	a	social	norm’,	did	not	ever	have	as	much	strength	as	advocates	of	transparency	and	‘publicness’	suggested	–	but	it	has	even	less	now.	Privacy	matters,	and	that	more	people,	businesses	and	governments	realise	that	has	a	connection	to	Edward	Snowden.	Privacy	has	political	value,	ethical	value,	legal	value	and	potentially	commercial	value,	as	businesses	seek	to	portray	themselves	as	privacy-friendly	to	gain	competitive	advantages.	
																																																								30	As	argued	in	Bernal,	'A	right	to	delete?',	European	Journal	of	Law	and	Technology,	2014,	2	(2).	31	See	for	example	Selinger/Hartzog,	‘Obscurity	and	Privacy’,	in	Routledge	Companion	to	Philosophy	of	Technology,	Pitt	and	Shew	eds.,	forthcoming	2014.	
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Many	things,	however,	have	not	changed.	The	extent	to	which	businesses	gather	data	for	their	own	purposes	shows	little	sign	of	abating.	The	primary	concerns	of	the	big	Internet	companies	in	the	light	of	the	Snowden	revelations	have	been	to	suggest	that	they	are	trying	to	limit	the	extent	to	which	the	government	agencies	have	access	to	their	data	and	systems,	and	to	differentiate	their	kind	of	surveillance	and	data	gathering	(which	they	say	is	to	help	people)	and	the	governments’	kinds	of	surveillance	and	data	gathering	(which	is	an	unwarranted	intrusion).		What	also	has	not	changed	in	relation	to	the	right	to	be	forgotten	is	the	concern	over	freedom	of	expression	–	to	the	extent	that	it	was	real	in	the	first	place,	rather	than	a	cover	for	a	wish	to	protect	business	models.	This	needs	to	be	taken	seriously.	
	
1.	 Workable	solutions	and	meeting	the	challenges	How,	then,	can	workable	solutions	be	found,	solutions	that	meet	the	genuine	challenges	made	and	address	the	issues	that	continue	to	be	raised.	A	starting	point	is	to	return	to	the	splitting	of	the	issues	as	set	out	in	table	1	above:	
	
	
	
	
	
Table	2	
Solutions	 Type	of	data		 Stories	 Data	Forgetting		 Obscurity	–	and	the	right	as	suggested	in	Google	Spain	 Data	obscurity	-	stronger	encryption,	leaner	business	models,	more	distance	between	businesses	and	authorities		Erasure		 No	general	right	appropriate	–	freedom	of	expression	overrides.	 The	right	to	erasure	–	enforcing	data	minimisation	
Only	the	stories	really	engage	freedom	of	expression.	If	the	kind	of	right	set	out	in	the	Google	Spain	ruling	can	be	more	suitably	defined,	it	could	provide	an	appropriate	‘right	to	obscurity’.	Defining	it	suitably	is	a	challenge	–	but	one	that	the	data	protection	reform	process	needs	to	embrace.	In	Google	Spain,	as	many	of	the	commentators	have	pointed	out	and	to	an	extent	the	reaction	of	Google	has	highlighted,	too	much	power	is	in	the	hands	of	Google	and	the	other	search	
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engines.	Guidelines	as	to	where	the	balance	should	be	placed	between	freedom	of	expression	and	privacy	need	to	be	more	explicit	and	clearer.	What	constitutes	‘old’	and	‘irrelevant’,	for	example,	needs	to	be	discussed,	agreed	and	properly	set	out.	In	terms	of	erasure	rather	than	obscurity	of	stories,	the	balance	should	be	firmly	in	the	direction	of	freedom	of	expression	and	of	information.	The	permanent	erasure	of	a	story	quite	rightly	raises	significant	issues	of	censorship	and	the	rewriting	of	history	in	the	way	that	a	limited	form	of	obscurity	is	not.	To	establish	a	general	right	to	the	erasure	of	stories	seems	inappropriate.	There	may	be	cases	where	it	is	suitable,	but	these	will	be	very	rare	and	deserving	of	individual	consideration.	Moreover,	existing	law	such	as	the	law	of	defamation	may	well	cover	a	significant	proportion	of	those	cases	where	erasure	is	requested.	With	the	kind	of	data	for	which	freedom	of	expression	does	not	in	any	meaningful	sense	come	into	play,	the	balances	to	be	made	are	different.	Rather	than	balancing	privacy	with	freedom	of	expression,	the	balance	is	to	be	made	with	the	right	to	carry	on	a	business	–	and	from	a	human	rights	perspective	that	means	that,	in	general	and	as	acknowledged	in	the	Google	Spain	ruling,	the	right	to	a	private	life	should	remain	paramount.	In	order	to	enable	this	in	a	practical	sense,	for	obscurity	of	data	(for	example	from	government	intrusion)	the	kinds	of	moves	already	being	made	by	businesses	to	make	encryption	the	default	and	to	require	stronger	authorisation	for	government	access	is	a	starting	point.	For	proper	obscurity	this	needs	extending	to	data	sharing	between	businesses	–	and	ensuring	that	the	data	protection	reform	goes	through	in	a	robust	and	enforceable	form	is	the	key	to	this.	Ultimately,	however,	a	genuine	right	to	erasure	of	data,	where	freedom	of	expression	does	not	come	into	play,	still	appears	to	be	a	key	tool,	as	part	of	an	encouragement	and	a	possible	enforcement	for	data	minimisation.	This	kind	of	a	solution	would	address,	at	least	insofar	as	it	is	possible	to	address,	the	issue	of	maintaining	an	appropriate	balance	between	privacy	and	freedom	of	expression.	Whether	it	is	workable	is	another	question,	and	one	that	cannot	be	answered	definitively.	Google’s	implementation	attempts	so	far	have	been	clumsy	at	best	–	but	the	process	might	be	one	that	can	be	fine-tuned	into	something	practical.	Given	that	Google	deal	with	far	more	copyright	takedown	requests,	the	scale	should	not	be	insurmountable	–	and	the	speed	with	which	Google	put	the	system	in	place	suggests	that	with	more	time,	more	accuracy	could	be	attained.	With	better	guidelines	and	more	accountability,	the	seeming	increase	in	power	for	Google	would	be	reduced	–	and	it	must	be	remembered	that	to	a	great	extent	they	already	have	the	power	to	manipulate	search	results,	so	this	complaint	against	the	right	to	be	forgotten	is	to	an	extent	a	straw	man.	Similarly,	the	complaint	that	the	right	to	be	forgotten	reduces	Internet	freedom	is	largely	illusionary:	the	kind	of	freedom	suggested	does	not	exist	even	now.	The	influence	and	control	wielded	by	Google	themselves	and	the	mass	media	operators	who	are	some	of	the	most	vocal	opponents	of	the	right	to	be	forgotten	already	means	that	this	freedom,	in	Article	10	terms,	is	not	in	the	hands	of	ordinary	people.	The	right	to	be	forgotten,	if	better	implemented,	would	primarily	mean	a	shift	in	where	the	power	and	control	is	held,	not	an	increase	in	that	power	and	control.	
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2.	 Data	Protection	Reform	All	this	leads	to	the	need	to	focus	on	data	protection	reform.	The	process	has	been	slow	so	far,	almost	tortuously	so,	but	the	combination	of	the	revelations	of	Edward	Snowden	and	the	Google	Spain	ruling	makes	that	reform	urgent.	Amongst	the	many	things	that	have	been	learned	as	a	result	of	what	Snowden	leaked,	one	of	the	most	important	is	the	inadequacy	of	the	existing	regime,	both	theoretically	and	pragmatically.	A	new,	updated	regime	is	critical,	and	it	needs	to	have	the	tools	and	the	strength	to	be	able	to	hold	the	big	commercial	Internet	companies	to	account	–	and	to	encourage	them	to	find	ways	to	provide	the	kind	of	protection	and	privacy	that	people	need.	The	apparent	emboldening	of	the	European	courts	adds	to	this	urgency,	also	both	from	a	theoretical	and	a	practical	perspective.	Both	the	declaration	of	invalidity	of	the	Data	Retention	Directive	and	the	Google	Spain	judgment	exceeded	the	expectations	of	privacy	advocates	and	indeed	the	opinions	of	the	Advocates	General.	Both	are	significant	in	their	impact	and	unequivocal	in	their	direction:	privacy	matters	not	just	to	privacy	advocates	but	to	the	courts.	This	emboldening	could	have	a	further	impact:	strengthening	the	hand	of	those	pushing	for	a	strong	new	regime.	It	also	adds	support	to	the	arguments	of	those	who	suggest	the	right	to	be	forgotten	is	an	expression	of	the	basic	principles	of	data	protection,	and	hence	should	be	included	within	the	reform.	Conversely,	the	strength	and	at	the	same	time	potential	unworkability	and	burdensome	nature	of	the	Google	Spain	ruling	should	add	urgency	to	the	cause	of	those	who	have	hitherto	opposed	the	existence	of	the	right	to	be	forgotten.	As	the	right	already	exists	–	in	a	form	particularly	burdensome	to	precisely	those	companies	who	have	been	lobbying	against	the	right	–	they	must	perform	a	volte-face.	If	they	want	to	make	the	right	more	workable	and	less	onerous,	they	must	start	pushing	for	the	reform	to	happen	sooner	rather	than	later.	From	a	practical	perspective,	the	strength	of	the	Google	Spain	ruling	makes	it	seem	less	likely	than	ever	that	the	idea	of	a	right	to	be	forgotten	will	be	dropped	from	the	reform,	no	matter	how	much	lobbying	takes	place	in	the	opposite	direction.	The	question	seems	to	be	much	more	what	form	that	right	takes	and	whether	it	can	be	made	workable.	That	is	a	challenge	that	both	lawyers	and	technologists	need	to	face	up	to.	
